

But since my soul, whose child love is,  
Takes limbs of flesh, and else could nothing do,  
More subtle than the parent is  
Love must not be, but take a body too;  
And therefore what thou wert, and who,  
I bid love ask, and now  
That it assume thy body I allow.  
And fix itself in thy lip, eye, and brow.

“Air and Angels”  
John Donne

*The Golden Ass* has attracted much critical interest since the days of Boccaccio. Among the recent researches, some critics deal with such issues as language structure and narrative style (Winkler), sexual anxiety and the difficulty of integrating sex and wisdom (Bettelheim), the growth of feminine mind (Neumann), and the liberation of the feminine in man (Franz). There are also certain critics who place their focuses of attention on the problem of curiosity,<sup>1</sup> of sin (Mackay) and of Lucius's conversion to Isis (Shumate). It seems that no critic, up to now, provides an exhaustive and more satisfactory interpretation of the novel about shape-shifting and its influence on identity and fortune.

This paper is going to examine the novel from the perspective of identity, investigating the relationship between identity and metamorphosis (“change of one body into another or change of species”).<sup>2</sup> By doing so, it will hopefully shed new light on the adventures and transformation of Lucius as well as on a number of tales which were interspersed among the novel.

The term “identity” is used so common nowadays that one can find it in many articles of sociology, neurology, and the humanities.<sup>3</sup> One scholar even observed,

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<sup>1</sup> On the topic of curiosity, see G. N. Sandy, “Knowledge and Curiosity in Apuleius' *Metamorphoses*,” *Latomus* 31 (1972) 179-83; C. C. Schlam, “The Curiosity of *the Golden Ass*,” *Classical Journal* 64 (1968) 120-25; Patrick. G. Walsh, “The Rights and Wrongs of Curiosity,” *Greece and Rome* 35 (1988) 73-85; and J. L. Penwill, “Slavish Pleasures and Thoughtless Curiosity,” *Ramus* 4 (1975) 49-82.

<sup>2</sup> This definition of metamorphosis comes from Caroline W. Bynum, *Metamorphosis and Identity* (New York: Zone Books, 2001) 84.

<sup>3</sup> According to one statistical report on the term “identity” used in titles of articles listed in the

“the search for identity has become as strategic in our time as the study of sexuality was in Freud’s time” (Lynd 14). However, one will detect the word “identity” polyvocal instead of univocal in its meanings in the recent academic researches.

Generally speaking, among the dominant theories of identity, there are two types of different understandings—fixed identity and non-identity perspectives. According to Steven F. Freeman, the proponents of fixed identity include (1) Eric Erickson who regards the source of identity as creative solutions to the crises of youth, (2) Edward O. Wilson who holds that identity can be seen as a function of genetic makeup or nature, (3) Sigmund Freud who maintains that identity is derived from childhood experience or nurture, and (4) Gary S. Becker who argues that identity is determined by situational incentives or environment one has been in. By contrast, the non-identity supporters believe that identity, a continually shifting phenomenon, is comprised of often conflicting roles, identification, desires or interaction. These proponents include (1) Harrison C. White who defines identity in terms of relationships and roles one adopts in the social networks, (2) John Turner and Henri Tajfel who proposes that identity is associated with social group membership and identification, (3) George Ainslie who argues that multiple identity is closely related to conflicting interests, and (4) George Herbert Mead who suggests that identity is the results of symbolic interaction with others and self.

The eight different theories of identity mentioned above are briefly discussed as follows. In *Identity and the Life Cycle* (1994), Erikson argues that “[in] their search for a new sense of continuity and sameness, some adolescents have to refigure many of the crises of earlier years” (94) for a sense of identity formation. In other words, they have to actively synthesize their experiences to develop a stable sense of personal identity at this stage. However, he also emphasizes the fact that identity formation is “a lifelong development largely unconscious to the individual and to his society (122). However, Wilson offers a different perspective about

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Social Science Abstracts, it has “increased 400% from 1984-1996, and 2000% since 1961”. See Steven F. Freeman “The Problem of Identity in Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes,” diss., Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1998.

identity formation. He maintains that nature (genetic makeup) and natural connections (the relationship between human beings and the natural world) provide an essential vehicle for human identity formation. In *Biophilia: the Human Bond with Other Species* (1984), he concludes that human beings have a genetically-determined need to affiliate with natural settings and other life-forms and it is from this affiliation that we develop our sense of identity.

By contrast, Freud approaches the issue of identity formation from the perspective of socialization (especially family dynamics in the process of identification). In “The Ego and the Id” (1978), he states that “the effects of the first identifications made in earliest childhood will be general and lasting. This leads us back to the origin of the ego ideal; for behind it there lies hidden an individual's first and most important identification, his identification with the father in his own personal prehistory...But the object-choices belonging to the first sexual period and relating to the father and mother seem normally to find their outcome in an identification of this kind, and would thus reinforce the primary one” (31). In other words, childhood experiences such as the desire to be parent-like will lead a child to internalize and adopt the parent's values, morals, beliefs, attitudes, and other characteristics. Consequently, the child is deeply influenced by the parent in the process of identity formation.

Becker's perspective on identity is totally derived from situational incentives. In *The Economic Approach to Human Behavior* (1990), Becker contends that an individual identity is produced, like a commodity, through the use of market goods, services, and one's own time, and identity construction is both an individual and a group process by using a technology of production from a public known cultural knowledge. Generally, an individual's identity is determined by the environment in which one is involved for economic activities.

Quite different from Becker's viewpoints that individual identity is a result of situational incentives, White, in *Identity and Control: A Structural Theory of Social Action* (1992), insists that social structure creates people to fill available social niches. Identities do not necessarily equal to selves; rather, positions define the people. In other words, the role one plays shapes one's identity and as one changes

position, his/her character and individuality change as shown in the interpersonal relationship of the social network. This phenomenon can be best exemplified by Mark Twain's *Prince and Pauper*.

As a sharp contrast to White's structural identity theory, social identity theory propounded by Taifel and Turner assume that people possess group memberships which provide them with a sense of self-definition that arises from "the individual's knowledge that he belongs to certain groups together with some emotional and value significance to him of this membership" (*Social Identity and Intergroup Relations* 2). Tajfel states that his theory of social identity is "based on the simple motivation assumption that individuals prefer a positive to a negative self-image" (*Human Groups and Social Categories* 45). Closely related to Taifel's theory is the self-categorization theory proposed by Turner who developed it to give a more detailed account of the cognitive processes that underpinned the findings of social identity theory. His theory posits that the abstraction of self-categorization includes three different levels in the social self-concept—the self as a human being at the top, in-group/out-group categories at the middle, and personal self-categorization at the bottom based on "differentiations between oneself as a unique individual and other in-group members that define one as a specific individual person" (*Rediscovering the Social Group: Self-categorization Theory* 44-45). Social identity theory has been used to explain inter-group phenomena such as prejudice, discrimination, behavior, and subjective identity.

Ainslie, like Becker mentioned above, approaches identity issues from the perspective of behavioral economics. He argues in "Beyond Microeconomics" (1986) that multiple self is not a new idea because it has been much discussed since Plato and the individual's first order of business is to resolve the intrapersonal competing conflicts of interests. He uses hyperbolic discount curves to explain the individual preferences over time and has developed the model of picoeconomics to describe individual behaviors in decision-making of choices and the individual person's values in a multiple self. His theory of picoeconomics can be categorized into the type of multiple identity.

Quite different from Ainslie's approach to identity with a viewpoint of

behavioral economics, Mead propounds that identity formation is the result of the individual's symbolic interaction with others and self (the link between how we see ourselves and our ability to *imagine* how others might see us) through one's interpretations and definitions of situations. In *Mind, Self, and Society* (1934), Mead claims that identity is mainly shaped by the interplay between mind, self, and society. Mead conceives mind as "a social phenomenon—arising and developing within the social process, within the empirical matrix of social interactions" (133). The mind is formed through interactions with other and self-conversation by means of language. The importance of language in the symbolic communication is that, in Mead's words, "out of the language emerges the field of mind" (133). Self is the second element in Mead's theory about identity formation. The self is developed through learning how to take the role of the other. In the process of the self development, role taking helps to construct and refine the self through three phases—imitation, play and game, and the generalized other. Society, the last element of identity formation, consists of "common responses" by which "the modern civilized human individual is and feels himself to be a member not only of a certain local community or state or nation, but also of an entire given race or even civilization as a whole" (273).

From what has been discussed above concerning the eight types of dominant theories of identity, one can find that fixed identity theorists ignore the fact that a person's identity may grow or change greatly at any stage in the course of his life. In other words, identity is changing (in a constant flux) yet still keeping some visible traces of a person's past (traits and memories). By contrast, non-fixed identity theorists, though maintaining the importance of the continuity and change of the former self, overemphasize identity-position—group affiliations. As a result, these two different types of approaches to identity issues from various angles have tended to make identity fall into a dichotomous terminology: mind versus body or brain; nature (biology or gene) versus nurture (social or culture construction); self versus other. Generally speaking, a novel narrates a life story which, under the normal situation of existence, seems to be much more complicated than the choice of "either...or" a researcher makes able to effectively handle or analyze. Actually,

our daily experience reveals the fact that life is far beyond such a simple choice to offer a satisfactory answer. Therefore, it seems difficult applying these theories to cover completely all the issues such as identity, shape, metamorphosis, life story, and the species boundary in the current study. In addition, identity theories, developed within the context of modern society from the angles of politics, psychology, sociology, economics, language, and biology, are open to question in their appropriateness to be applied to examining *The Golden Ass*, a novel completed in the second century. These eight identity theories have one demerit in common—lack of a big-picture and circumstantial view to be applied to approach the ups and downs of a curious young man, his life story. Furthermore, they do not treat the issue of metamorphosis, the shape-shifting between human and animal. In fact, metamorphosis, mainly about crossing the species boundaries in the shape (replacement-change of the exterior) but retaining a former human self inside), is the main source of identity changes and sufferings for characters in this novel.

This study is going to make use of the framework of identity theory proposed by Caroline W. Bynum in *Metamorphosis and Identity* (hereafter *MI*) to discuss the relationship between identity and shape because Bynum did not approach identity issues by adopting a dichotomous viewpoint and, more to the point, as a medieval specialist in the field of late antiquity history of Western Europe, she covered the issues of identity, shape, life story, metamorphosis, and species boundary in her book. The major viewpoints of her theory can be described as follows.

First of all, identity can mean individuality or personality (something unique and integrate as a single man), identity-position (as a member of family, gender, class, or certain organization), or spatiotemporal continuity (carrying traces of a former self in the present shape) respectively in most modern theories of identity (*MI*). For Bynum, identity is what we the readers find in the tales from Ovid or in any story concerning the topic of metamorphosis: “the shape (or visible body) that carries story” (*MI* 180). In a sense of movement, life story means real change, always one thing coming after another. It carries a sense of continuity and change for a unique self through the display of actions or episodes.

In an Aristotelian sense, story involves *metabole*, the replacement of something by something else. Story spreads out through time the behaviors or bodies—the shapes—a self has been or will be, each replacing the one before. Hence story has before and after, gain and loss. It goes somewhere. Even if it is the story of repetition, or of salvation or destruction by a return whence it began, story has sequence. (*MI* 180)

Secondly, just as water and air is to human beings, so is shape to story. “It carries story; it makes story visible; in a sense, it is story. Shape (visible body) is in space what story is in time” (*MI* 180). In addition, shape indicates both the sameness and continuity of a self instead of simply an entity without a soul. It

encapsulates graphically and simultaneously the sequence, the before and after, of a self. But it can do this only paradoxically and partially, only in traces or vestiges, not fully. For what shape carries is story, and story is change; before must be (mostly) lost in order for there to be an after.” (*MI* 180)

It is worthy of noting that shape, for Bynun, means something suggested by the theme of metamorphosis while body is closely associated to the physiological and genetic components. Therefore, in one sense, shape is not a synonym of bodily form. Shape matters quite beyond merely as allegory or symbol in literary criticism. Bynun continued to argue that “[without] it, there is no story, and hence no self. For my self is my story, known only in my shape, in the marks and visible behaviors I manifest—whether generic or personal” (*MI* 181).

Thirdly, metamorphosis, for Bynun, indicates a certain two-ness—“the transformation goes from one being to another, and the relative weight or presence of the two entities suggests where we are in the story” (*MI* 30). Metamorphosis occurs only in between in the process of change because at the two ends (beginning and end) it is difficult to ferry out the transformed trace of either one. Hence, metamorphosis is “about process, *mutatio*, story—a constant series of replacement-changes, or, as Bernard of Clairvaux puts it, little deaths. It is about a

one-ness left behind or approached” (MI 30). Metamorphosis breaks down species categories by breaching them. It is a kind of replacement-change rather than that of evolution-change. The former shows a new and different entity in its appearance with little trace left about the previous entity while the latter presents biological or psychological images as a gradual process of unfolding or developing with visible trace left about its former shape. In one sense, metamorphosis is a body-exchange phenomenon within a very short period of time without completely losing behavioral traces of what it was as a human being.

Finally, Bynun contended that change is an essential element for metamorphosis, shape, life story, and identity, and “change is the test, the limit of all denotations of the term ‘identity’” (MI 19). Change is indispensable to story. Without it, story goes nowhere. Change is also a natural phenomenon that is unavoidable to shape. “All we can hope for is that the traces of our story endure in the body we are becoming. It is when shape no longer carries story, when the traces or vestiges are completely erased, that identity is lost” (MI 182).

In the story of *The Golden Ass*, Apuleius describes his themes as the transformation of “shape and fortunes.”<sup>4</sup> Shape means a lot to Lucius. As a matter of fact, his identity and fortunes change along with his shape and so are the characters of the tales in the novel. Shape is the outer embodiment of behaviors, memory, intelligence, or inner intentionality. It is the symbol of a psychosomatic unit, not merely an implication of the physiological and genetic. It includes persona (public image, mask), clothing, hairstyling, and bodily appearance (associated closely to the theme of metamorphosis). Shape also has something to do with the issue of one’s face (in a figurative sense, one’s face stands for not only personal identity but also social status and its implications). Besides, our human shape (the body), Anthony Giddens points out, is “not just a physical entity which we ‘possess’, it is an action-system, a mode of praxis, and its practical immersion in the interactions of day-to-day life is an essential part of the sustaining of a coherent

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<sup>4</sup> See “Introduction” to *The Golden Ass*, xix. All parenthetical page references concerning Apuleius’ *The Golden Ass* (hereafter *GA*) are taken from the text translated by Patrick. G. Walsh, New York: Oxford University Press, 1999.

sense of self-identity” (*Modernity and Self-identity* 99). To any human being, shape is important for self-expressing, daily experiences, and recognizability. Without it, one might become an invisible man and lose the sense of identity.

In book 2 the tale of Actaeon, the hunter, changed into a stag by Diana for the sake of spying, out of curiosity, the goddess naked in a pool and torn to pieces by his loyal hounds, exemplifies what a tremendous difference between a human shape and an animal one. Filled with terror and helplessness (though with a deer’s shape yet retaining his former human mind still), he found that his ability of commanding language failed him at the critical moment. He could not call his dogs by their names and let them know who he was. Because of losing self-expressing shape, he lost his identity as the master of his dogs. Consequently, he lost his self, his life, and his life story ended, so to speak.

What happens to Actaeon foreshadows the later transformation of Lucius into an ass and his suffering from a lot of maltreatments that would not happen to him if he were what he had been. Throughout the whole novel, one theme related to shape is worthy of noting, that is, good-looking shape is closely associated to the sexual attraction and may incur misfortune to some of the characters who own it. For example, Pamphile is notorious for her seducing handsome young men by means of practicing magic on their stolen hairs (*GA*). She enchains handsome youths with the fetters of love, and, after a certain period of time, transforms them to other shapes once she gets bored of them.

Another example concerning good-looking in book 8 is that Charite’s beauty, instead of bringing her with happiness, incurred death not only to herself but to her husband Tlepolemus as well. In a sense, these victims lose their identities and lives just for the sake of their attractive shapes.

In the tale of “Cupid and Psyche,” shape implies not only a sense of identity and of safety but the issue of one’s face and an apotheosis as well. At the very beginning of the story, Psyche’s beauty won her a lot of admiration of people from far and near. People “flocked to set eyes on this famed cynosure of their age” (*GA* 75). And they even “crowded round her with wreaths and flowers to address their prayers, as she made her way through the streets” (*GA* 76). In fact, people regarded

her as the Goddess Venus on the earth. But much to her regret, no man would propose her. “All admire her godlike appearance, but the admiration was such as is accorded to an exquisitely carved stature” (GA 77). So her beauty became the very source of sadness and torment to her. All she could do was lamented “her isolated loneliness. Sick in body and wounded at heart, she loathed her beauty which the whole world admired” (GA 77).

Serving as a sharp contrast, her elder sisters though with modest beauty, had contracted splendid marriages by wedding to royal suitors. Much more worse than all this is that Psyche was destined, according to the oracle of Apollo, to “wed / A fierce, barbaric, snake-like monster, He, / Flitting on wings aloft, make all things smart, / Plaguing each moving thing with torch and dart. / Why, Jupiter himself must fearful be” (GA 78). Even with extreme unwillingness, she had to succumb to her fate to have a marriage of death. She was left alone in black mourning gown at the top of the hill waiting for the serpent spoken of in Apollo’s oracle. With the help of a gentle breeze (Zephyr), she was sent downward to a valley at which she found a brilliant palace.

Inside the palace, a group of handmaids and chorus, one singer and one musician were in attendance on her. But no person could be seen. The only thing shows that they were there was their voices. How they might look like was unknown to her. In one sense, they do not have any shape by which to distinguish one person from another. They were disembodied voices, no more and no less. So far as Psyche is concerned, without a recognizable shape, they do not have a personal identity in the sense of uniqueness, distinctiveness, and particularity (though this kind of perception might be opposite for these invisible entities). And it is difficult to know their group identity because of the lack of uniform or any visible musical instruments. In addition to the lack of a visible shape, they do not have the sense of identity as spatiotemporal continuity. So it is not too far-fetched to say that they are invisible men: no name, no shape, no identity, and, in one sense, even no existence at all, at least in Psyche’s eyes because identity also means how people are to be seen and accepted by others. Therefore, the life in the royal palace is somewhat like a dream without any sense of reality (Schroeder).

In spite of the fact that Psyche enjoyed her life in the paradise-like surroundings, she felt something lost. Her unseen husband had warned her solemnly more than once that she was forbidden to gaze on his face under any circumstances, on pain of being separated from her forever. And he also revealed to her the secret:

“Soon we shall be starting a family, for this as yet tiny womb of yours is carrying for us another child like yourself. If you conceal our secret in silence, that child will be a god; but if you disclose it, he will be mortal.” (GA 86)

Upon hearing this, she promised that the last thing in the world she would do was to seek to see his face.

Unwilling though she was, she did not keep her words when her sisters egged her on to pry into his appearance and to kill her unseen husband, a fearful winged dragon, on the ground that the beast might devour her and her baby when they became the richer fare. When Psyche violated the taboo and found out that her unseen husband was no other person but Cupid himself, the god was wakened up by a drop of burning oil upon his right shoulder. He sadly bade her farewell, saying that “[love] cannot live where there is no trust” (Hamilton 96) and flew away.

What Cupid said, at first glance, seems to be quite reasonable and persuasive, but upon further evaluation of the whole situation, one will find that it betrays the fact that Cupid showed a lot of male chauvinism. He demanded Psyche to trust him blindly without any condition. So far as Psyche was concerned, her unseen husband was still questionable because she did not know who he was. Whether he was a god or a winged serpent is a matter of life and death. Self-preservation is one natural instinct for animals and human beings. According to the “Hierarchy of Human Needs” pyramid<sup>5</sup> developed by psychologist Abraham H. Maslow, safety needs (security, stability, law and order) are things placed just above the basic needs (food, water, shelter, and sex). The function of the basic needs is to maintain the

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<sup>5</sup> Abraham Maslow first introduced his concept of a hierarchy of human needs in his 1943 paper “A Theory of Human Motivation” and his subsequent book, *Motivation and Personality*.

continuity of a human shape that is the carrier of life story while the purpose of security need is to keep any danger far away from a human shape. There is no denying the fact that love must be based on trust, but that must be mutual trust, rather than blind, one-sided trust. A visible shape, for Psyche, symbolizes a sense of security, of identity, of stability, and of reality. Cupid could offer her a life of luxury, far above the basic needs, but not safety needs.

What is behind the motivation that Cupid played the role of an invisible man and created an atmosphere of tension between Psyche and himself? If shape (or visible body) is the symbol of identity, it also indicates the responsibility one has to take for what he does. Without shape, there is no identity, and no identity equals irresponsibility. One needs not to worry about the possible consequences of his behaviors. Deep anxiety about honor, shame, and morality is laid aside. And this situation can be best exemplified by the kind of masquerade held by the middle and upper classes in England in the eighteenth century.<sup>6</sup> The purpose of putting on a mask and dressing oneself as weird as possible is for the sake of making one person become a total stranger to those who know him. The change in one's shape erases one's recognizability and, as a result of this, one's responsibility.

In the case of Cupid, he was trapped in a dilemma whether to follow his mother's instruction to let Psyche fall into love with the vilest and most despicable creature in the whole world or to be Psyche's lover himself. It is too painful for him, a child of self-preoccupied exploiter of others,<sup>7</sup> to endure the burning fire of desire he felt for Psyche. But it is equally unpleasant for him, a mother's boy, not to do what her mother bade him. Under this condition, self-deception comes to the rescue. In a case such as this, the deceiving of oneself may be a project whose goal is in

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<sup>6</sup> Thanks to the anonymity of masks and disguises, people are free to engage in debaucheries without risking any loss of reputation. On the negative implications of masquerade, see Terry Castle, "Eros and Liberty at the English Masquerade, 1710-90," *Eighteenth-century Studies* 17 (1983-84) 156-76.

<sup>7</sup> The characteristics of the eternal boy include the omnipotent child warrior, the narcissistic, self-preoccupied exploiter of others, and fantasies of flight. All these fit in quite well the personality of Cupid, see R. F. Newbold, "Flights of Fancy in Nonnus and J. M. Barrie," *Electronic Antiquities* 3.5 (1996) 1-10.

one's own best interests. What is crucial to self-deception is that "[it] takes time and a careful, if devious, planning to get oneself to ignore what would otherwise be plainly admitted" (Guttenplan 560). Therefore, Cupid hides "his identity and appearance to avoid his mother's wrath" (Vidal 218) on the one hand and enjoys his love for Psyche on the other.

Self-deception is a possible form of escapism for Cupid, the *puer aeternus*, or the eternal boy (Franz). As an eternal boy, he was acutely sensitive to shame and mockery. To be an invisible man with no definite identity facilitated him to do what he desired, enjoying his wanton pleasure on the one hand and avoid confronting the fact that he neglected his mother's instruction on the other. Without a visible shape and a recognizable identity, he needed not to face his own guilty conscience. But all this must be based on one condition that no one discovers his shape and forces him consciously to face the music. And this is the reason why Psyche's seeking to pry into his face becomes a taboo.

There are also two episodes in the tale of "Cupid and Psyche" related to the problem of shape and identity: the trials imposed on Psyche by Venus and Psyche's apotheosis (transforming from a mortal into a goddess). In order to atone for what she had done to Cupid, Psyche promised Venus to fulfill any tasks that the goddess asked her to.

Psyche was demanded to finish four tasks: first, to sort out a heap of the mixed crop seeds; next, to get some golden fleece; then, to fill up a flask with black water from the source of the river Styx, and finally to get some beauty-charm from Proserpine. Of course, these tasks were far beyond any mortal's ability to carry out, but, with supernatural aids, Psyche completed her missions impossible in the hope of reuniting with Cupid.

After Cupid had flown away, Psyche jumped into a near-by river to commit suicide. But the stream cast her ashore safely in order "to pay homage to the god who often scorches even the waters, and in fear of his person" (GA 94). The same goes for the ants who got wind of Psyche's trouble—being asked to separate a heap of mixed seeds before nightfall—and "took pity on the great god's consort," giving

her a hand to divide out seeds for she was “Cupid’s wife” (GA 105). As for the green reed that instructed Psyche how to get some golden fleece, it was “divinely inspired by the gentle sound of a caressing breeze” (GA 106). It happens that Zephyr was under the command of Cupid. And the eagle of Jupiter helped her to fill up a bottle of black water just in order to direct “his veneration for Cupid’s power to aid his wife in her ordeal” (GA 108). It is not too exaggerating to say that all these helpers lent timely aids not for taking compassion on the sufferer but for the persona (in a Jungian sense) that Cupid might have played—for the sake of his face, a symbol of identity of the god of love.

The ordeals Psyche had to go through are matters of great significance. They can be regarded as rites of passage for her to become a member of a new family as well as her later apotheosis. As an innocent girl, Psyche was not expected to be familiar with everything about housekeeping. Marriage, as a rite of passage, changes her role (group identity) from a princess to a housewife. Therefore, symbolically, learning how to distinguish one kind of crop seed from another, to know the material of weaving clothes (golden fleece), to get water of life,<sup>8</sup> and to make up herself by using cosmetics is absolutely necessary for a girl such as Psyche. These ordeals are indispensable trainings for her to be, in the truest sense of the word, a housewife.

Even though the high tower urged Psyche beforehand “not to open or pry into the box” within which hidden “the treasure of divine beauty” (GA 111), she, on the drive that “beauty is every woman’s birthright,”<sup>9</sup> opened the box to take some of beauty-charm and make herself “pleasing to [her] beautiful lover” (GA 111). Upon the very moment of opening the box, she found that “there was no beauty-lotion” but “a truly Stygian sleep” which made her “no more animate than a corpse at rest” (GA 111). In one sense, she was dead if there was no rescue from Cupid in time.

Psyche’s journey to Hades to fetch beauty-charm and her opening the box can

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<sup>8</sup> Erich Neuman views Psyche’s third task as a quest for the water of life, see *Amor and Psyche*, 1 February 2011 <<http://comminfo.rutgers.edu/~mjoseph/neumann.html>>

<sup>9</sup> See Jean Grey, in the frontispiece of *Beauty Belongs to You* (London: Mill & Boon, 1956)

be taken as her experiencing the process of death and resurrection. As is well known to human beings, Hades is no place for any living mortal to travel in and out. And the same can be said of her sojourn in Olympus. When Jupiter declared Cupid and Psyche as man and wife in the face of all gods, he then offered her a cup of ambrosia to make her immortal. To be a goddess, for Psyche, means a significant transformation not only in her shape (no more ageing or death) but also in her identity (from a mortal girl to a goddess and, as a consequence, no more excuse, for Venus, of unequal social status in marriage). In short, all ordeals make her prepared for her final apotheosis. However, apotheosis is also the end of her story because hereafter there is no more spatiotemporal continuity of a shape to carry her life story. When there is no change in her shape, it means no more any life story to continue and develop in the very sense of identity.

Psyche's story, narrated exactly midway through the novel, already foreshadows the themes of Lucius's fall, suffering, wanderings, and salvation. The revealing parallels between novel and tale were highlighted by classical scholars because "[t]he larger novel recounts a similar story of a young man's ignorance and enlightenment, travails and metamorphosis" (Vidal 218). In the adventures of Lucius, magic plays a quite significant role. He was so fascinated with magic that he would, at any price, try his hand at it. The unbelievable enthusiasm for magic incurred him all the trials he would undergo in his life story. His eagerness to transform himself into a bird indicates one fact that Lucius has an innate desire to free his body from the bondage of time and space, to manipulate the secret powers of nature. In addition, he desires to explore "the human soul, its conscious and unconscious states and expressions" (Genest 1). In other words, Lucius wants to become relatively more omnipresent, omniscient, and omnipotent than common people through the power of magic art.

At first, Lucius pleaded Photis to help him become an owl by rubbing the same ointment that Pamphile had used only few minutes ago. He wanted to be an owl soaring freely in the sky to transcend the limit of his body. But, ironically enough, he turned himself into a donkey instead, due to rubbing all his limbs with wrong ointment given by Photis. Generally speaking, a donkey is associated with

the negative side of animal characteristics— stupidity, lust, curiosity, and gluttony. In antiquity, metamorphosis into an ass was generally interpreted “as a kind of allegory of lasciviousness” (Franz 60). Changing to be a certain animal, for Bynun, indicates the existing character of the transformed person. In the case of Lucius, he was lustful and curious before his being turned into an ass. After having become an ass, Lucius is maltreated by people from different walks of life and even by other animals because of the loss of his human shape and of his self-expressing ability. In the time of Apuleius, as Margaret Anne Doody points out, the Romans are at the top of the power structure whereas the ass is placed at the bottom. The major difference between high and low is that the former cannot be beaten. Before becoming an ass, Lucius was a knowledgeable young man with high birth and rank (as indicated by the priest’s admonitory remarks in book 11). He was supposed not to be beaten while staying his human shape and identity. However, as an ass, Lucius was badly treated by most of his masters. In addition, the poor ass “bears all the economic and social burdens in the most literal manner” (Doody 12). The replacement-change in shape drastically alters Lucius’s identity (personal and group) but offers him a good chance, as an outsider, to observe stupidity, violence, and evil in human society.

If Lucius were transformed into a complete ass (inner and outer) without any traces or vestiges of his former self, his condition as an ass probably would be more tolerable than what actually happens to him. In the shape of an ass, he unfortunately retains “his human intellect, enclosed in the animal frame” (*GA*, xxii) but is “deprived of the human faculties of gesture and speech” (*GA* 53). According to the criteria proposed by Bynum, his case of metamorphosis can be categorized as magic change, change of body but not of soul, more like putting on a terrible mask, or clothing a man with a coat of hair (*MI*). In one sense, his soul is imprisoned in the shape of an ass.

In the second part of the novel (book 4-10), Apuleius portrays a series of sufferings falling upon Lucius the Ass in a degenerate world as the punishment for his sins (lust, curiosity, and pursuit of the art of magic).<sup>10</sup> Episodes included are

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<sup>10</sup> Joel. C. Relihan argues that it is Lucius’s curiosity, lust, and pursuit the knowledge of magic that

the attack from his own horse and servant, his grisly experience with the bandits, his privations at the mill, his ordeal at the hands of a sadistic boy, the degrading life with a band of catamite priests, and the show arranged for his copulating with a murderess.

The first trial he underwent is his life as an ass to get along with another ass and his trusty horse in Milo's stable. Much to his dismay, he found that they both "put their heads together and at once plotted [his] destruction" (GA 54). To Lucius the Ass, the only reason for them doing so was for the sake of their provender. However, this is only partially true, not the major reason why they reject him. As a matter of fact, the real animals, with sensitive intuition, can detect the discrepancy between an animal shape and the human mental faculties in Lucius the Ass, who does not behave like an animal should in harmony with its instincts. The dilemma he finds himself in is that "within his donkey's skin he still feels like a human being. He is treated like an animal, but inside, in his subjunctive inner world, he is not one" (Franz 64). That is to say, his transformation into an ass changes his human shape and consequently alters his identity at least so far as other people and animals are concerned. However, his inner self insists that he is still a man. Therefore, it is pretty clear that he fails both in the "crossing of role boundaries" and "crossing of species boundaries" (MI, 119). This is the very beginning of a series of sufferings and travails he as an ass has to go through. Closely followed this episode is that his own servant stops him from eating the roses of the garlands by which he can return his human shape. He was beaten by his servant with a cudgel until a band of robbers broke into Milo's house. His taking an ass shape forced him to give up his identity and hence forfeit his privileges as a human being.

The next turning point in his ass life occurs when a band of robbers took him away as a vehicle to transport their loot from Milo's house. The robbers treated him cruelly with the incessant blows of cudgels and with heavy baggage. They thought that Lucius the Ass brought them only bad luck—the enormous loss of their bravest comrades and the lack of profitable gain. One robber even suggested that after the

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strip the young man of his humanity and transform him into an ass. See "Introduction" to *The Golden Ass*, xvi.

ass having finished the work, it should be pushed over the cliff at once to make him a welcome meal for vultures. Some even figured out one plan to have the ass killed and Charite sewed naked inside his belly but left her face outside to punish them for their escape away from their base.

As suggested already, his failure in crossing role and species boundaries as a real ass makes Lucius get into trouble in the matter of identity. On the level of identity as individuality, the ass, upon hearing that the whole crowd at Hypata accuse him as the clear culprit of the robbery, went to great lengths to plead his case by seeking to say “no guilty” in public, but the words failed him. He forgot that he was deprived of his articulate speech on the spur of resentment at the injustice imposed on him. The same happens on another occasion when at a busy market, the Lucius-turned-ass tried to call out Caesar’s name in his native Greek tongue to appeal people, but he failed to do so. For people, he was an ass if judged from his shape, but to Lucius, he was both an ass and a man simultaneously, no more and no less. In one sense, his condition gives him a sense of separation and alienation from human society in which he should be a member.<sup>11</sup>

On the level of identity as group affiliation, he did not emotionally identify himself with the group of robbers for what they had done in their daily lives. Even though he lived with them and helped them carry their loot, he consciously thought that he was not an in-grouper but an out-grouper because he was forced, not out of his free will, to do so. His former well-educated mind still cherished his conceptions of morals, values, and other beliefs in spite of his assuming an ass shape. In other words, he took an identity-position quite different from that of the robber group. In order to make a defensive against a sense of identity confusion, he excluded them by taking the policy of civil disobedience.

In the last aspect of identity as continuity, Lucius the Ass’ ability to maintain inner sameness and outer continuity was not matched by the sameness and continuity of his meaning for others (Erikson). In other words, the disruption of his

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<sup>11</sup> According to Andrea K. Schutz in his 1995 study, the theme of metamorphoses “denotes the possibility of voluntary fluidity, it also delineates the reality of separation and definition” (xi). Separation often leads to the loss of identity.

human shape and the continuity of his self was the source of trouble for him. The robbers and even Charite treated him as a real ass but to Lucius there was a continual dialogue between his ass shape and his human self to reach an acceptable agreement about a sense of identity.<sup>12</sup>

The third ordeal Lucius-turned-ass underwent is his privations at the mill. He was entrusted to a groom by Tlepolemus (Charite's fiancé) who saved Charite and the ass from the bandits. Lucius the Ass was supposed to have a good and happy life in return his taking care of Charite while staying in the base of the bandits. However, this groom's greedy wife, used up all his strength to turn the mill not only for her house but also for her neighbors. In addition, she

would sell my barley, which I had crushed and ground under the same millstone by my own circling movements, to neighboring farmers, while she would put before me, after a day harnessed to the exhausting contraption, some husks of bran, unshifted and grimy, with lots of rough gravel permeating it. (GA 129)

The miserable life Lucius the Ass led echoes what Doody has suggested previously that the ass is at the bottom of the power structure but shoulders the economic and social burdens with no voice and with a marginalized position.

After this episode, Lucius was sold to a woman and a sadistic boy. The adolescent boy used him to carry firewood from the rocky and steep mountain cliff and ledges which made his hooves get hurt and beat him savagely and repeatedly on "the one spot on my right hip, so that the skin was broken, and the huge sore beneath formed into a cavity; I say a cavity, but it was more like a well or a window. He never stopped thumping the blood-smearred wound over and over again" (GA

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<sup>12</sup> In *Metamorphosis and Identity*, Caroline W. Bynum points out that "hybrid is spatial and visual, not temporal. It is inherently two. Its contraries are simultaneous, hence dialogic" (30). But this is not the case of Lucius. What happens to him is not a combination of half man and half ass in the outward appearance. Therefore in the case of Lucius, it is a dialogue between the ass shape and the human soul.

130-131). Besides, the boy gave Lucius the Ass a heavy load of timber and, when the load slid over to one side, he would pile up some stone to the other side to balance the uneven weight. The sadistic boy also fastened some sharp thorns together into a bundle and attached them to his tail as a sting of torture. Apart from this, he spread out the rumor that the ass pursued women and sodomized them; so the villagers decided to castrate Lucius the Ass, who only escaped by having a piss all over the inimical old woman who attempted to burn his genitals. The inhumane treatment Lucius gets is all derived from his bestial shape and the loss of his identity as a high rank citizen.

The fifth trial the Lucius-turned-ass experienced is his life with a bunch of depraved catamite priests who “parade through the streets of towns banging cymbals, shaking castanets, and carrying round the Syrian goddess whom they adduce to solicit alms” (GA 154). He played double roles “as a walking larder” to put into store whatever people contributed to these fake priests and “as a walking temple” (GA 157) to carry the statue of the Syrian goddess to follow wherever the priests wandered.

As stated before, his trouble, replacement-change in the exterior yet with the human nature remaining inside, does not lessen due to having new masters. At this stage of his trial, Lucius the Ass found that his social identity was much more threatened than that of personal identity. In spite of the fact that he did not have a chance to resume his human shape, he was at least safe temporarily without having any worry about being killed or mutilated by this group of catamites. Hope for a bright future still stood with him together. If his personal identity as a unique individual did not get any improvement, nor did it become much worse than ever.

But, as a remarkable contrast, his social identity was in danger of being broken down. The term “catamite” is etymologically derived from Ganymede, the cupbearer of the gods in Olympus. As a general rule, these priests should dedicate themselves to offering services to the goddess and become devoted votaries. On the contrary, they were “representative of the meanest dregs of society” (GA 154) for they led a life of wanton pleasures. The well-built young man the catamite priests had bought played the role of “communal bedfellow, spreading his services

around” (GA 156) for them. He even told Lucius the Ass at their first meeting: “May you win the approval of our masters, and relieve the pressure on my now wearied loins.” What he had said forced Lucius “to give thought to the fresh trials in store for [him]” (GA 156).

The threat confronted him lay not so much in sex-orgy as in sexual perversion. These catamites, male as they were in their physical structure, had an unnatural sexual inclination. They played the role of female. Even though Lucius the Ass had his soul trapped in an animal body, he had been a well-educated young man with high social rank before this accident. So it is nothing to be surprised about his choice to be a member of out-group by exposing “the most despicable outrages of unnatural lust” they committed collectively with “a peasant of powerful physique” (GA 158) in their lodging. Lucius the Ass made a clear and strong sound that caught the attention of several young men searching for their stolen ass. They broke in and caught sight of the obscenity on the scene. And this forced them to depart the region earlier than they had planned. But the real reason for the catamite priests to be thrown into a jail was their taking away one golden goblet from the shrine of the Mother of the gods. This matter made an end to the trial of Lucius with these priests.

The last trial that Lucius-turned-ass experienced is the show arranged for his copulating with a murderess in public. It seems appropriate first to have a look at the history of Lucius’s indulgence in his unbridled and unquenchable lust. Immoderate lust is one of the major sins that Lucius committed as a young man and as an ass-man. His relationship with Photis, a slave maid of Pamphile, provides an example of his using the girl only for his own purposes—to satisfy his insatiable sexual desire and to steal the magic ointment for him from her mistress— rather than for true love. Firstly, He had “enjoyed a wild love-orgy. When [he] was wearied with her feminine generosity, Photis offered [him] a boy’s pleasure” for “a few nights in such pleasurable pursuits” (GA 51). Secondly, he coaxed her to steal the magic ointment by using remarks such as “Bind me as your slave for ever by a favour which I can never repay, and in this way ensure that I shall become a winged Cupid, drawing close to my Venus” (GA 52). Thirdly, Lucius and Photis

occupied different social positions, one at the top of the power structure whereas the other at the bottom (slave and ass are put in the same class). Lucius did not love her nor show any concern for her after the robbers broke in. What he worried was about his money and his horse, but not about her. Finally, Lucius was so furious with Photis for giving him wrong ointment which turned him into an ass that he “gave long and serious thought to whether [he] should end the life of that most nefarious and abominable woman by kicking her repeatedly with [his] hooves and by tearing her apart with [his] teeth” (*GA* 54). This confession clearly indicates his lack of true love for her. Therefore, it is reasonable to say that he “sinned against the law of chastity in his affair with Photis” (Franz 37).

Lucius’s insatiable lust is not curbed even after he is transformed into an ungainly ass. The misshapen form made him upset but “[t]he sole consolation [he] could see in this wretched transformation was the swelling of [his] penis—though now [he] could not embrace Photis” (*GA* 53). Traditionally, the ass is considered a creature with excessive appetites of lust and gluttony (Hartman). Lucius-turned-ass shows his lustful disposition when allowed admission to the herds of horses as a reward for his taking care of Charite. He “began to mark down the mares which would make the most suitable bed-mates for [him]” (*GA* 54). Unfortunately, he was expelled by stallions and had to suppress his frustrated sexual desires. It is horrible to think over the idea that the ass-man with a human mind and memory wants to mount on mares just in order to gratify his carnal lust. However, he gets an opportunity to satisfy his sexual appetites when an eccentric noblewoman pays his keeper to have sex with him. In her chamber, the lady of position and wealth “was repeatedly whispering gentle endearments, pressing constant kisses, and uttering rapturous sounds with devouring eyes; and as climax she murmured ‘I have you, I have you, my fond dove, my sparrow’” (*GA* 206). This wild love-orgy continued for a couple of nights, and then the keeper informed his master, Thiasus, of the sexual performance. Therefore, Thiasus arranged one public show for Lucius the Ass to copulate with a murderess that had killed several people just out of insane jealousy for her husband’s providing hospitality for his estranged sister. This public sexual performance makes Lucius the Ass anguished and anxious because “[he

repeatedly felt the urge to contrive [his] own death rather than be defiled by the contagion of that female criminal, and feel the ignominy of disgrace at a public show” (GA 211). Why does Lucius prefer committing suicide to being defiled in public by a murderess? Is it possible that his moral and ethical concerns get the better of his unquenchable lust? In the days of Apuleius, murder, along with many other crimes, was punished usually by some kind of torturous death. Besides, in a society based largely on the notion of honor, to be disgraced was something worse than death, especially the public shame. Although the public shame afflicted him, his fear of death caused him in an agony of torment because he was uncertain about what would happen to him after this show. Without anyone keeping an eye on him, he decided to take “off at full gallop” (GA 216) for six miles and reached a beach at Cenchreae. It was there that he prayed the goddess Isis for help to restore his human shape.

For all that his existence as an ass was full of trials and tribulations, it was not without any advantage. Covered with the shape of an ass, Lucius found that “no one took any account of [his] presence; they all did and said whatever they like without inhibitions” (GA 169). In addition, he was endowed with a pair of massive ears and could overhear things that were going on at a distance. As a result, he learned a lot of things about humanity from the trials he had experienced. Actually, it was his ears that helped him in advance keep away from dangerous situations and at the same time entertain him with diverse tales that were told among the novel. For example, he knew beforehand that the cook was going to cut off his throat for a haunch to take place of the stolen venison, and that he was arranged to copulate with a notorious woman in public. Besides, his stealthily stuffing himself with numerous leftovers a cook and a baker brought home makes him become an unusual ass. His habitude as a man still lurked in his inner mind in spite of his being transformed into an ass in the exterior. In other words, his intelligence and memory of a rational man did not lessen at all. However, his ass shape made people treat him as an animal due to his loss of group identity. Consequently, Thiasus cherished him both as a dinner-companion and as a means of transportation just because he ate food like human beings and was able to perform a number of tricks

under instructions.

Just as Mikhail M. Bakhtin has pointed out in *The Dialogic Imagination*, the position of Lucius the Ass is conducive to the spying and overhearing on private life, which can be nothing public about it. His placement as a “third person” in the novel makes it unnecessary for him “to participate internally in everyday life” on the one hand and “to occupy in it any definite fixed place, yet who at the same time pass through that life and are forced to study its workings” (124). In other words, he plays the role—the narrator (auctor) as character (actor) and the character of the narrator (Winkler). As a matter of fact, his role, as Bakhtin has suggested, determines the structure of the novel.

In the shape of an ass, Lucius loses his personal identity as a unique individual so far as other people are concerned. He is not the same or identical person to the others. In one sense, he is an invisible man because no one takes his presence seriously and feels no embarrassment in his presence no matter how one might behave. At the same time, he does not identify himself with any masters he performs services whatever lines they belong to. Since he is on nobody’s side, he does not have any social identity. And he therefore can be an objective bystander as well as a storyteller. To those people around him, he is of no significance, just an ass. To the reader, he is the very person who does much to shape the structure of and to carry the movement of the novel. To Lucius himself, his life as an ass leads him later to go through three different initiations, which helps him become a votary of Isis, a shrine-bearer, and one of the quinquennial administrators.

It is salutary to note the reason why his transformation back to human shape happens in public. He must eat roses and stand there naked, waiting for a priest to cover him with a shirt under the very eyes of the public. He becomes the target of mockery for having been an ass and has to bear all this humiliation for two purposes. First of all, his fascination with magic leads him into isolation from his community and from society as a whole due to his having been changed into an ass. His returning to society needs a rite of passage to make him disconnect with what he was as an ass outwardly. With the synergy of the public, he will become a moderate citizen in his future life, no longer a man the priest admonishes in public:

“In the green years of youth, you tumbled on the slippery slope into slavish pleasures, and gained the ill-omened reward of your unhappy curiosity” (*GA* 227).

On the other side, the rite also points to the consecration of his life to the service of Isis. After all, it is the goddess Isis’ grace of salvation that makes him revert to human. He regains his sense of personal identity as a distinctive individual and becomes a follower of the religion of Osiris-Isis (a new social identity). In addition, he gets again a sense of spatiotemporal continuity by casting off the shape of an ass. There is no more any discrepancy between shape and mind, a split in the psychosomatic unit.

As for his experience in the three initiations, it can be regarded as another kind of metamorphosis—“a rite of voluntary death and of salvation” (*GA* 232). It completes a profound transformation of his whole being. It has a great influence on his identity in three different aspects. First of all, his personal identity changes as a result of the spiritual growth (a kind of evolution-change). This will then indirectly affect his behavior when he gets along with other people, and exclude him from social vanity by having a totally different viewpoint of life.

With regard to group affiliation, the initiation experience will help him consolidate his determination to be a follower of the religion of Osiris and Isis. So it is nothing beyond expectation that he takes the tonsure and becomes a shrine-bearer. According to von Franz, the tonsure means sacrificing “one’s own self-willed thoughts” to “a higher principle.” It is “a symbol of spiritual rebirth, and therefore he has, like a newborn child, a bald head” (194). Besides, it also represents a social identity, an in-grouper of a cult of religion. In the aspect of identity as spatiotemporal continuity, the tonsure changes his visible shape but there are some traces of the old Lucius still to be seen. His changed shape presents a sense of continuity for people who know him. In this sense, he is “a constantly new thing that is nonetheless the same” (*MI* 189).

The story of Lucius’s experience in shape-shifting between human and ass may help us, from the perspective of identity, to reconsider the problem of cosmetic surgery in the present society. As it is well-known, make-up application, dressing,

and hairstyling may alter the appearance of the body and these changes in shape serve the function of expressing one's individual identity. Therefore, any kind of transformation from face-lift to a sex-change operation to breast enhancement can be taken as one type of metamorphoses even though it is quite different from the one that Lucius experienced. They function to fill in the gap between what it is and what it should be (in spite of the fact that the criteria of beauty in one society are mainly and deeply shaped by social and cultural construct and it is possible that one society has its own expectations of shape beauty that is different from those of other societies). Changes in shape can have great psychological impact: they let people "feel complete and whole for the first time in their lives" (Anderson 1) at least they have come up to their expectations as well as those of other people.

The controversy over body versus soul has a long history in the Western civilization.<sup>13</sup> It has been a topic for research in the field of philosophy, theology, literature, sociology, and so on. By contrast, the history of studying the identity issue is quite short. The term "identity" contains implications from "how one sees oneself to how others see one to a nexus of relationships" (Freeman, 2). A shape (a visible body with social and cultural construct) is served as a symbol of entity—visible to oneself as well as to others. Without a human shape, there is no possibility of recognizability and hence no identity either to oneself or to other people. It is needless to say that man is a psychosomatic unit. One needs a body for his soul to function—to experience, to contact, and to communicate. A human shape is the embodiment of one's existence in space, and it changes in the wake of time, leaving only traces or vestiges of what one was behind it. A person's shape carries his/her life story, and, in one sense, it is the life story itself. The loss of one's human shape leads to the loss of one's identity and hence disrupts one's own life story. Transformation into an ass causes Lucius to undergo a lot of sufferings

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<sup>13</sup> The origin of the body-and-soul debate can be dated as far back as the Middle Ages. The medieval dialogues concerning body and soul are essentially moral debates about the relative responsibility of body and soul for man's Fall. In the early seventeenth century, the body and soul dialogues move from a religious to a philosophical sphere. Later on, the debate develops into a discussion dialogue, in which the main concern of the writers is to criticize political and religious conditions; they no longer care about their departure point, the cause of the Fall. See Rosalie Osmund, "Body and soul Dialogues in the Seventeenth Century," *English Literary Renaissance* 4 (1974) 364- 96.

and ordeals which can be avoided if, only if he possesses a human shape and a voice to communicate with other human beings. The same goes to the case of Actaeon. The theriomorphic shape-shifting (Schutz's term) creates a boundary over which is difficult for Lucius the Ass to cross because of the separation from human as well as animal world (with an ass's shape but a man's mind) and of the position at the bottom of power structure. His case indicates that no matter when and where all people need human shapes to carry a sense of identity—identity as individuality, identity as group affiliation, and identity as spatiotemporal continuity. These three aspects of identity are often intermingled together. It is difficult to discuss one and not to mention the other two. More to the point, the sum of these three senses of identity is not equal to the whole of a psychosomatic unit. Perhaps what Bynum has remarked that “Shape (or visible body) is in space what story is in time” (180) can appropriately explain the relationship between shape and identity and also explicate clearly the three senses of identity used by most of modern scholars.

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