

Introduction

Jamison Green, the author of *Becoming a Visible Man*, is an activist of transgender and transsexual movements. Green combines his personal FTM (Female to Male) transition experience as well as informed knowledge and academic analysis of sex, gender and sexuality politics in his *Becoming a Visible Man*. His autobiographical narrative from childhood to adulthood and the journey from a girl, a lesbian to a man with HRT (Hormone Replacement Therapy) and SRS (Sex-reassignment Surgery) provide a unique FTM insight and epistemology of transsexualism. In *Becoming a Visible Man*, Green introduces in detail the physical aspects of his personal experiences in transsexualism—the diverse terms, costs, reliable surgeons, processes of HRT and various “top” and “bottom” SRS. Green’s lucid introduction and illustrations of HRT and SRS make outsiders and bewildered insiders¹ understand better the notion of the transsexual. In addition to the bodily operative reformation in the posthuman context, the connection between the prosthesis (for instance, dildo) and the transgender body are discussed as the representation of posthuman embodiment. As described in physically prosthetic practices of posthuman, the gender characteristic and masculinity might be considered as another kind of prosthesis which can be equally expressed and possessed by men and women without prejudice and debasement. The fluidity and mobility of boundary-crossing in “masculinity,” which is a critical concept in Judith Halberstam’s *Female Masculinity*,² subverts the uniqueness and authority of male masculinity. Thus, female masculinity challenges the authenticity, originality and the “realness” of male masculinity. In a sense, masculinity is a particular kind of prosthesis in gender expression rather than an existing essence rooted in the biological body of men or a standard principle.

¹ Some “insiders” still have questions of their sexual identifications.

² Halberstam questions the relationship between maleness and masculinity and claims that the

In *How We Became Posthuman: Virtual Bodies in Cybernetics, Literature, and Informatics*, N. Katherine Hayles gives a clear definition of “posthuman”:

First, the posthuman view privileges informational pattern over material instantiation....Second, the posthuman view considers consciousness.... Third, the posthuman view thinks of the body as the original prosthesis we all learn to manipulate, so that extending or replacing the body with other prostheses becomes a continuation of a process that began before we were born. Fourth... the posthuman view configures human being so that it can be seamlessly articulated with intelligent machine. (2-3)

Through Hayles’ definition of “posthuman,” we know human beings invent, use and control machines, and usually take for granted that we are superior to machines and other animals in the chain of being; however, at the same time, machines also have great power over human beings because we come to more and more rely upon machines than ever. New technology challenges human senses of superiority and uniqueness because we cannot live without machines. Technology becomes part of our lives and the distinction between human beings and machines is less clear; the two parties become even inseparable, like the idea of prostheses that Hayles mentions.

Besides Hayles, another important posthuman scholar Robert Pepperell also puts a lot of emphasis on the interdependent relationship between human beings and machines. As Pepperell mentions in his *The Posthuman Condition: Consciousness beyond the Brain*, “I wish to examine a distinct kind of self-awareness of the human condition that owes something to our anxiety about, and our enthusiasm for, technological change, but is not entirely determined by it” (1). The term “posthuman” is employed to consider human existence, especially in the wake of the Age of the Renaissance, which is generally considered the time when humanism starts to be on the rise. Thus, “after humanism” is the first term

masculinity is the social, cultural and political expression of maleness.

Pepperell used to define “posthumanism.” Pepperell also defines the “posthuman” as “post-biological”-- “insofar as the decaying category of ‘human’ can be seen merely as a subset of an increasingly virulent ‘techno-biological’ of which we might be but a transient phase,” and “transhuman.” The root of these two synonyms of “posthuman,” “**post**-biological” and “**trans**human” resemble Haraway’s boundary-crossing in cyborg criticism. Since “post” refers to “after,” the meanings of “posthuman” and “post-biological” are beyond the fixed definition with mixture and transformation of varied elements and possibilities in crossing or associating the distinct boundary.

Pepperell has listed some contemporary developments in the dependence and conjunction between human beings and technology, such as robots, communications, prosthetics, intelligent machines, nanotechnology, and genetic manipulation and artificial life. Robots are not only machines, for instance, but human-like machines. Rodney Allen Brooks, the Panasonic Professor of Robotics at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, foretells that in the future, robots will achieve the same or equivalent level of human intelligence as well as human will. Indeed, the robot in the postmodern era is with multiple and varied functions: the factory helper, the cleaning machine, the housekeeper, the companion, the sex doll, and even the alternative choice for marriage. The two twentieth-century films, *A.I. Artificial Intelligence* and *The Stepford Wives* portray and foretell a view that the future family can be possibly constituted of human beings and robots.

Prosthesis, the key element of posthuman, is our link between the transgender and the posthuman. As Hayles claims, a human body is our “original prosthesis,” so the extending or replacing the body with other prostheses is a necessary and natural process from birth to death. Beside the medical prostheses, the polysiloxane breast, electric pacemakers, artificial joints and skins, which have already been recognized as the prostheses by most people, the domain of the prostheses have already reached into people’s daily life in making false teeth,

filling teeth, wearing glasses, wearing wigs and implanting silicon to build a perfect bust. These varied and multiple prostheses create a more perfect life and resolve some biologically diseased and imperfect conditions of human bodies.

Pepperell also points out that the integration of humans with machines in bio-engineered prosthetics parts extends the “artificial body.” Though some prosthetic instruments have existed for a long time, such as spectacles, the internal workings of the body, like pacemakers and artificial heart valves are newly invented. That the electromechanical devices replace or enhance damaged organs is recently put into effect and continues to improve the function of human eyes and limbs in particular (Pepperell 5). The body of the transsexual with HRT (the hormone replacement therapy) and sex-reassignment operation is the embodiment of the integration between technology and the human. Not only the transsexual’s reformed body with the artificial penis, clitoris and reformed breast, but the transgender, who may not have undergone the actual medical or surgical procedures to become the other sex, represent the combination between the prosthesis and body in their using of varied tools in sex, the dildo in particular.

In “The Life Cycle of Cyborgs: Writing the Posthuman,” Hayles mentions that the conjunction of technology and discourse is very crucial to the identification of the posthuman (156-61). Simultaneously, Haraway’s cyborg myth also responds to the idea of “entities” versus “metaphors” and living beings versus narrative constructions. Haraway claims that feminists like Joanna Russ, Samuel R. Delany, John Varley, James Tiptree, Jr., Octavia Butler, Monique Wittig, and Vonda McIntyre are all theorists for the cyborg because all of them attempt to cross the boundaries of sex, gender and sexuality. They are the cyborg theorists in the way of writing the body:

Exploring conceptions of bodily boundaries and social order, the anthropologist Mary Douglas should be credited with helping us to consciousness about how fundamental body imagery is to world view,

and so to political language. French feminists like Luce Irigaray and Monique Wittig, for all their differences, know how to write the body, how to weave eroticism, cosmology, and politics from imagery of embodiment, and especially for Wittig, from imagery of fragmentation and reconstitution of bodies. (*The Haraway Reader* 31)

Cyborg is not just a robot, which is purely technologically produced and simply manifested by hi-tech technology and machinery, but the mixture of technological power and discursive and narrative imagination. In the technical sense, people with electric pacemakers, artificial joints and skins, even artificial sexual organs, and drug-implant systems are all included in the category of cyborgs. In the sense of “metaphoric cyborgs,” most people nowadays can be regarded as cyborgs, such as people with glasses and people of specific occupations, including “the computer keyboarder joined in a cybernetic circuit with the screen, the neurosurgeon guided by fiber-optic microsopy during an operation, and the adolescent game player in the local video-game arcade” (Hayles 115). Even the kids with electronic pets that sleep, eat, and excrete as real animals on the screen and in the simulacra world are cyborgs in a metaphoric sense. Considering the actual and metaphoric identification of cyborgs, a new kind of subjectivity is generated in the formation of the posthuman and postgender world.

In *Cyborg Worlds: The Military Information Society*, Douglas Noble also suggests that the cyborg is not a fictional imagination, but a real image of modern American soldiers, such as the pilots wired into cockpits, and the gunners connected into the computerized guidance systems (13-42). According to these examples, it is easy to imagine what can be the transsexual’s “bio-engineered prosthesis”—the hormone replacement therapy and their artificial genitals, dildo and artificial clitoris, as mentioned before. Hayles strongly claims that human body is the original prosthesis, which could be manipulated, extended and replaced with other prostheses during the life in a posthuman perspective. The

technological therapy and prostheses integrate people's original prosthesis (body) to improve and complete a more harmonious life condition. As Green comments after he personally accepts these technological experiments,

[O]ur bodies have the internal, cellular receptors to process the hormones so that our minds and bodies connect, extending the brain into the body so that we feel the connection resolving the conflict between body and mind. HRT [the hormone replacement therapy] doesn't make us into someone we are not, but enables transsexual people to be more of who we are, to be more at home in our bodies, the way we imagine non-transsexual people feel in their bodies since their sex and gender are aligned. (94)

The integration of technology and human beings is for the search of a better life quality. In a sense, for the transsexual, the HRT and prostheses are some of the ways for them to pursue and fulfill their dreams. Hayles also asserts that body transformations do affect the mental constitution: "When the body is integrated into a cybernetic circuit, modification of the circuit will necessarily modify consciousness as well. Connected by multiple feedback loops to the objects it designs, the mind is also an object of design" (115). Jamison Green's transsexual experience, which is elaborated in *Becoming a Visible Man*, proves that body transformation does influence the mental recognition. Before Green takes the sex-reassignment surgery, it is possible for "her" to achieve "real presence" for herself. The female Green always feels alienated from herself, but after the surgery, the male Green claims that "the only proof of it [the self] is in the strength of one's connectedness with others, the kind of connectedness that I could not truly feel until I became a visible man" (169). Since we cannot live all by ourselves in the society, Green's conclusion proves that the society and people around us do affect our self-perception.

Sex and gender are different. For Green, sex is the hardware, gender the

software. He explains:

Sex is a system of classification that divides body types based on presumed reproductive capacity as determined typically by visual examination of the external genitalia...that we call 'male' and 'female'....Gender is another system of classification that describes characteristics and behaviors that we ascribe to bodies, and we call those characteristics and behaviors 'masculine' or feminine.' (*Becoming* 4-5)

According to Green, the hardware "sex" refers to biology and genitals. We have been judged as men or women since we were born. Gender presumes the social and cultural anticipation about man's and woman's temperaments. Social norms suppose women are graceful, beautiful, tender, delicate, weak and nurturing; men are brutal, strong, aggressive and active. People in society think that the hardware (sex) and the software (gender) should be mutually compatible and match each other flawlessly, as Green points out, "there is an operating system that allows the software and hardware to give meaningful instructions to each other so they work together to accomplish tasks" (*Becoming* 7).

If the hardware and software work smoothly without conflict, this situation means a person's sex and gender are perfectly aligned, and his or her behavior conforms to expected social values. However, if the male-bodied person doesn't have any masculine temperament or the female-bodied person doesn't possess the feminine gender characteristics, s/he must be in pain and trouble and makes others feel uncomfortable because s/he violates or threatens our epistemology of "appropriate" sex, gender and sexual orientations. Green calls this "standard" sex/gender system the "arbitrary system of categorization" (*Becoming* 5). This arbitrary system of categorization has existed for a long time. If what one thinks and the way one acts conforms to this arbitrary system, then one can survive well, but if not, one will experience despair, bewildering, fear, shame, anger, embarrassment and humiliation and this is probably doomed as one's

destiny.

Yet, gender is like a language with various dialects. Crossdressers, drag kings and queens, androgynous transgendered people, butches, femmes and the transsexual are all gender categories. Sex has been decided since one is born. Gender seems to be bundled up with sex, but people can decide how they “speak” and interpret gender. Since it involves social relationships, gender is “defined, negotiated, corroborated, or challenged” between speakers and listeners (Green, *Becoming* 191). The social norm constructs not only gender, but also social relations among people. Gender expression is a survival mechanism. It is not about privacy in bedroom. Sometimes it is about life and death, especially for the transsexual. Green proposes:

[G]ender is the interface between our psyche and our cognitive mind/body/sex. I conceive of gender as an aspect of personality, of the way we manifest who we are in the world. When we express negative judgment about another person’s gender expression, whether that judgment comes from our own conservatism (supporting a rigid gender dichotomy that disdains fluidity), or liberalism (supporting a wide variety or fluidity of gender expression that disdains rigidity), we are expressing a lack of tolerance for diversity, a lack of appreciation for individuality. (*Becoming* 193)

The queers, including gay, lesbian, transgender and transsexual are all victims to this fixed composition and categorization. They are victims because they are oppressed and persecuted by this arbitrary system of categorization without having done anything wrong. It is nothing wrong when a female or male soul is put in the opposite body or when someone falls in love with others of the same sex. Green claims, “It can’t be our fault we were wrong in our categorization; it had to be that we were deceived, or we wouldn’t have been wrong at all. I think it’s

fascinating that we perceive it this way”³ (*Becoming* 5-6). Though Green has an optimistic philosophy and shows positive humor toward life, he eventually decides to undergo an HRT and sex-reassignment surgery to change his sex and demonstrate his maleness visibly.

Green believes everyone has the right to choose the gender he or she prefers. It is inhuman and unfair that anyone can impose and judge another person without considering how that person feels, and whether or not that person “should” express in his or her gender according to his or her biological sex. As Kessler and McKenna put it, “[B]iology provides ‘sign’ for us. Signs are not gender, but they serve as ‘good reason’ for our attributions in a world where biological facts are seen as the ultimate reasons” (77). However, one can express and interpret one’s gender regardless of one’s biological sex, and not care about others’ comments and judgments. Nevertheless, if someone does not “speak the same language” as the majority, s/he will have a difficult life and society and related institutions usually tend to render the minority other speechless.

Sexuality lies between sex and gender, but does not have a fixed, definite essence. Essentialists often regard sexuality as “a fixed essence, which we possess as part of our very being; it simply *is*. And because sexuality is itself seen as a thing, it can be identified, for certain purposes at least, as inherent in particular objects, such as the sex organs, which are then seen as, in some sense, sexuality itself” (Padgug 49). Most people take it for granted that a transsexual is also a homosexual. The truth we overlook is the transpeople do not completely identify themselves as homosexuals. Initially, they gain knowledge, support and warmth at gay or lesbian bars. Then they gradually find themselves different from many gays and lesbians. Thus, they seek the HRT and the sex-reassignment surgery. However, the transsexual are usually excluded by the gay and lesbian

³ The “we” in Green’s quotation is a group of people like Green who has the problem in gender and sexual identity.

community after their transition because gay and lesbians view this “transness” as the consolidation and identification with the heterosexual and patriarchal hegemony. With regard to this exclusion, Green comments that “[t]hey [gay and lesbian] forgot that straight people often think that gay people want to be the opposite sex, or think that crossdressing, transsexualism, and homosexuality are all different words for the same thing” (*Becoming* 79). Green argues that the gay and lesbian community should support those who want to be the opposite sex in the politics of allying with those gender and sexual deviants⁴ even though they are indeed different.

Gay and lesbian are satisfied with their sex (hardware) and fall in love with the same sex. Transpeople hate their body, and think their gender (software) has been put in the wrong sex (hardware). HRT and sex-reassignment surgery is one way to “correct” this mistake. In a sense, the transsexual might be perceived as a type of heterosexual. Before HRT and sex-reassignment surgery, they deny their biological sex and they don’t think they are dating with the same sex. Green has identified himself as a heterosexual and holds an open attitude toward the transpeople’s gender identity. He proposes that the transpeople can define their sexualities as the heterosexual as well as the homosexual after their transition. Louis Grayson Sullivan⁵ also suggests the distinction between sexual orientation and gender identity and the fact that “transsexual people could be gay or lesbian or bisexual after their transition—orientations as valid as heterosexuality” (*Becoming* 54). This quotation suggests that sexual orientation is not necessarily related to gender identity. Multiple and diversified sexualities lie between sex and gender. Jason Cromwell defined sexuality as follows:⁶

⁴ Judith Halberstam uses the word “deviant” in her *Female Masculinity*. Since Halberstam is a transgender butch, the negative meaning of “deviant” might be transfigured and reformed in a different aspect through queer performativity as the word “queer.” In this dissertation, I follow Halberstam’s practice in my use of the word “deviant.”

⁵ He is the leader of the FTM group.

⁶ Jason Cromwell is a FTM, an anthropologist, the author of *Transmen and FTMs* and the editor of *Information for the Female to Male Crossdresser and Transsexual*.

Constructionist theories do not view sexualities as inherent but rather as inventions of societies that have been given meanings. Within these theories, sexuality is seen as having a history and being situational....Regardless of the model or the system of knowledge from which it is derived, sexuality is the result of relations among or between individuals and is created by them....Those on the periphery of culture, such as gays, lesbians, and transpeople, feel less constrained by the limitations placed on their identities, regardless of which identity or identities has resulted in their being marginalized. (37)

In *Becoming a Visible Man*, the title suggests that becoming a visible man is the way of Green's self-actualization and only through this process can he feel connected with others. To the transsexual, "body" is an important media to gain self-acceptance. Physical self-recognition is a critical way for them to distinguish themselves from the homosexual. The homosexual accept their body and enjoy their body; however, the transsexual usually hate their body before the transition. The body sense is important because we perceive things through our body, as DiGiacomo has stated, "It is through our bodies that we experience and come to know the realities of our worlds" (114).

The body seems common to us because everyone has one. In their "Introduction" to *The Making of the Human Body: Sexuality and Society in the Nineteenth Century*, Gallagher and Laqueurs argue that the body has been researched in the way of social construction and entitled to its specific history since the late 1970s. People realize that the conceptions of the body are differently perceived though body is "common" to everyone (vii). Scheper-Hughes and Locks analyze the body discourse from three perspectives: "first, individual body experience (i.e., the phenomenological body); second, as a symbolic system for thinking about culture, society, and nature (i.e., the social body); and third, as an object that is subject to either social or political control (i.e., the body politic)"

(“The Mindful Body” 7-8). Scheper-Hughes and Lock discuss the phenomenological body further: “we both are and have bodies and ...we think and act through our corporeal selves” (“The Message in the Bottle” 409). The corporeal body helps us to sense and perceive things. In this regard, the body represents a whole self and the location of subjectivity, not simply a vehicle of mobility. In short, if we think of the phenomenological body as “sex,” then the social body is assumed to be of the similar definition of “gender.” The body is the medium of transmitting information from social, cultural, institutional and educational systems and helps sustain the steady condition and function of social system. The socialization process attaches specific symbolic meanings to our body, the sexual parts in particular. We take and accept the meanings of social symbols because these symbols have already been acquired unconsciously from our cultural, educational and national mechanisms since our birth.

Through an interaction between sex and gender, the body politics has formulated the “law” and “legitimacy” for the body. Scheper-Hughes and Lock interpret the body politics as “what can or cannot be done with bodies—laws that regulate abortion, surgical reconstruction of ambiguous genitals and categorization of disease” (“The Mindful Body” 25). Indeed, on the one hand, body politics regulates the “legitimate” sex, gender and the “appropriate” sexuality, which conform to the norm of society. However, on the other hand, in the postmodern and postgender context, the multiple possibilities of assembling and composing sex, gender and sexuality within the body provide the new definition of body politics. The “inconsistency” of sex, gender and the “inappropriate” sexuality are what Green wants to explore in his book. Green claims that transsexualism is about life and one’s relationships to others in society. It would not and should not be regarded as the private relationship between intimate individuals. Lesbians, gays and transpeople have been stigmatized by society due to the fact that they are deemed “abnormal.” Gender and genitals are viewed as strongholds to constrain

people's behavior within a social norm that describes what is allowed and what is forbidden. The idea that someday people can freely express their gender is threatening to the dominant society. Green has questioned what the dominant one is going to lose by denying the legitimacy of transsexual and transgendered people. Is it the institution of heterosexual marriage? Is it the right to treat another people as an equal, an inferior, or a superior human being? These well-established standards are used to persecute or privilege some groups of people. As an insider of the transsexual or gender-variant people, Green undertakes an experiment on his body with the diverse body politics, to "give rise not only to new ways of organizing behavior and identity but to new ways of symbolically resisting and engaging with the dominant order" (Vance 877).

To Green, transsexualism is one of the basic human rights and the sex-reassignment surgery, like any other medical cosmetic surgeries, is one of the choices and opportunities for gender-variant people to change their sex and therefore feel comfortable toward themselves and others. In the very beginning of his book, Green gives the definition to the term of "transsexual" as follows:

"Transsexual" is a term that the medical profession has applied to that subset of transgendered people who seek hormonal and surgical assistance to change the sexual characteristics of their body to bring their gender and their body into alignment, people for whom that physical change is the only possible satisfactory accommodation to their transgender status, and who usually wish to be accorded full legal and social status in their congruent gendered sex. (14)

The above passage shows that Green tries to clarify the subtle difference between the terms of "transgender" and "transsexual." Obviously, the category of "transgender" is more general than "transsexual." The apparent distinction between the two terms is the sex-reassignment surgery. The transgender do not have to change their sex since HRT or sex-reassignment is not a very urgent or

necessary means for them. Compared to “transsexual,” “transgender” is a grassroots and political term that identifies the gender-variant people; whereas, “transvestite” (a psychological condition) and “transsexual” (a medical condition) are the diagnosis (Green 14). Green points out that many transsexual people despise the transgender because the category of transgender is “so new, broad, and subjective, we have no way of counting the number of transgendered people in the word” (14). Green does not stress “transgender” as a euphemism for “transsexual” and objects to using “transgender” and “transsexual” interchangeably because this will erase the specificity of individual experience. Green seems to despise the general term “transgender” because of his evidently transsexual identity. However, he justifies this by stating: “I also do not believe that there is any one way, or any better way, to be transgendered or transsexual, or that one expression is more real or valid than any other”(15) and claims that he will use the term “trans” or “transpeople” to describe both transgender and transsexual experiences. He might think “trans” or “transpeople” are safe terms politically without making a clear distinction between transgender and transsexual. He explains his inconsistency for the reason that his definitions are not the last words in these matters and defining is always and still proceeding with these complex conditions. He also cites one example that the so called “transgender care” from the health insurance administrators does not necessarily mean the aid to hormonal and surgical sex reassignment but is usually viewed as the support to all gender-variant people who receive the basic and general health care without discrimination. This phenomenon further affirms their self-identity in sex, gender and sexuality.

The transpeople feel that they are living with a lie when they attempt to live with their assigned sex, and the lie is something like “doing drag,” disguise or masquerade. Only through “passing” can they feel they are being seen and they feel they can expose their true self. Without passing, their life seems to be deceiving and false, and passing brings recognition and self-esteem. For some

transpeople, “passing” is an urgent matter. However, the idea of passing is opposed by many feminists. Some feminists disapprove of the transdiscourse because they think the HRT and sex-reassignment reinforce the sex binary opposition and gender stereotype. For example, in her *The Transsexual Empire*, Janice Raymond argues that MTF is part of a scheme by men to permeate the women’s movement, “All transsexuals rape women's bodies by reducing the real female form to an artifact, appropriating this body for themselves....Transsexuals merely cut off the most obvious means of invading women, so that they seem non-invasive” (104). Raymond suggests that transsexualism is based on the “patriarchal myths” of “male mothering,” and “making of woman according to man's image” in order “to colonize feminist identification, culture, politics and sexuality” (104). She maintains that for women “the construction of gender dissatisfaction has been medicalized through promotion of breast implants, hormone replacement therapy, infertility hormones and reproductive procedures, and plastic surgery” (xiv). Raymond states that “the medicalization of transsexualism prevents the destruction of stereotypical gender roles and reinforces sexism, presumably by acknowledging that people want to be gender-congruent” (xvii). In a sense, Raymond’s theory suggests that it is impossible to change sex and despises all FTMs as the betrayers of feminism.

Green criticizes Raymond’s self-centered and narrow-minded feminist viewpoint in which transsexualism is perceived as a threat and invasion to female bodies, feminism and feminist politics. Without a understanding of the transpeople’s similarly marginalized position as the feminist, Raymond’s selfish feminist standpoint requests and forces all transpeople to give up their desires to re-assign and re-integrate their incoherent gender identity and biological body. Green disagrees with this feminist universalism, which is without any consideration of the urgency of the transsexual’s survival in real life, so he protests against Raymond’s particular brand of feminism that cannot survive without rigid gender

roles, and especially not without the objectification and vilification of men. (*Becoming* 185)

Other than Janice Raymond, the other scholar Bernice Hausman also criticizes the sex reassignment surgery in her *Changing Sex: Transsexualism, Technology, and the Idea of Gender*. She interviews doctors and transsexuals to conceptualize the physical, medical and psychological relationships in the body. Furthermore, the research of endocrinology and the sex reassignment surgery of the transsexual contextualize her historicization of the current concepts of sex and gender. She boldly challenges feminist claims by proposing that "it is through an analysis of the emergence of transsexualism in relation to the developing medical technologies of 'sex change' that we can trace the introduction of 'gender' as a term referring to the social articulations of sexed identity" (196). What distinguishes Bernice Hausman from Janice Raymond is Hausman's claim that gender does not exist. For Hausman, gender is only an euphemistic expression to replace sex, and therefore gender is nothing and gender variance is allowable. Obviously, she despises the homosexual because in her theory, gender is only related to heterosexuality as she claims "gender is a concept meaningful only within heterosexuality and in advocacy of heterosexuality" (194). She assumes that gender is nothing but sex, and sex is only the binary system. The paradox is that she does not admit the existence of gender while she takes the HRT and sex-reassignment surgery as a way to assert the transsexual impersonation and to reproduce gender as "the real sex" (193). Additionally, she claims that surgery is for the transsexual to accept and accommodate "a cultural fantasy of stable identity" (193). Hausman examines the pain which the transsexual describe in their autobiographical narratives after they undergo the sex reassignment surgery, and uses it to prove how it can "undermine the text's primary argument that the subject was really meant to be the sex he or she must be surgically fashioned into" (167). She considers that the pain of post-operation is enough to demonstrate her argument that the transsexual's body

through the sex reassignment surgery is unnatural.

As a transsexual, Green argues against Hausman's bias:

Hausman's position links us all to only one path of binary sexual expression: No matter who we are or what we do socially or sexually, our unchangeable maleness or femaleness defines us. She renders us all speechless....The quality of being free of physical pain does not confer a greater veracity on any subject's experience of gender. Further, Hausman ignores the psychic pain of pre-operative transsexual people. (*Becoming* 186)

Furthermore, Green opposes Hausman's concept of denying the existence of gender by claiming that gender is a way of communication, something like our clothing, our posture, our language, our sex and our sexuality. Gender is complicated, diversified and problematic, not simply an euphemistic expression for "sex." According to the Gender Recognition Act 2004,⁷ sex and gender are definitely two different terms with different contexts. In the definition of the Act, one's acquired gender is defined as one's legal sex and hence sex is preceded and exceeded by gender. Under the circumstances, sex is determined by gender identity. In other words, one has the right to choose one's preferable social role. Gender is no longer determined by sex which has been decided since one's birth.

Gender should be irrelevant to biological sex or chromosomes termed by the Gender Recognition Act 2004. Green's recognition of sex and gender completely agrees with this Act. Additionally, Lafayette Ronald Hubbard also comments that "the known biological aspects of sex difference—which we call natural and think of as immutable—are no more immune to change than the psychosocial manifestations of sex difference—which we call gender and cultural, and understand to be mutable (*Becoming*, 186). Green believes that the reason for

⁷ The Gender Recognition Act 2004 is an Act of the Parliament of the United Kingdom that allows transsexual people to change their gender legally. It came into effect on April 4, 2005.

making a man a “man” is not on account of his looks and organs such as penis, beard, receding hairline or flat breasts but his self-recognition as a man. Self-acknowledgment is more important than anything else. As a result, “man” might appear in any “form”—feminine, androgynous or masculine. As a transsexual, Green rebukes the prejudices of Raymond and Hausman:

We are a group of men who do not achieve gender membership through our genitals, yet we are still accused of buying into stereotypical gender roles simply because we are transsexual men and have a masculine appearance, because we have beards or a particular musculature. No one asks transsexual men about our politics; very few of us are asked about the ways in which we manifest sexual desire. How would anyone know whether we are “buying into stereotypical gender roles.” Or whether we simply fit some categorical gender stereotypes and don’t fit others, just like anyone else? (*Becoming* 191-92)

Green regards the HRT and SRS as placing the gender-variant people in the “right” category which they should originally belong to and fit in. Instead of criticizing the transsexual’s surgery as “buying into stereotypical gender roles,” Green protests that they have only achieved a “homecoming” to where they have been seeking all those years.

The posthuman body is a way for the transsexual to survive. Whether they are the transgender or the transsexual, their survival is based on the hybridity and impurity in a political strategy of the alliance with all the “difference within.” The concept of posthuman is important for the community of transpeople because the posthuman definition emphasizes on the fluidity, hybridity and flexibility of the biological body as well as gender identity.

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